Malware Analysis of Kimsuky's Attacks - android and elf

Latest Research|January 21, 2025

Malware Analysis of Kimsuky's Attacks - android SecAI news picture

Kimsuky has intensified sample delivery on the mobile phone side since 2024, with an increasing number of Android type samples. Homologous to the sample analysed in ③, the apk sample is therefore the FastViewer tool used by Kimsuky's organisation, which has an icon disguised as the Setting settings tool.

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The sample was obfuscated using the proguard tool that comes with the java language to combat static analysis, as shown below:

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FastViewer uses jks certificate (Java-based certificate format) for signing, the certificate information is as follows.

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In the configuration file, the malicious apk needs to request additional permissions from the user (phone message acquisition/background running/notification sending/network access/persistent service running/SMS message reading/device self-boot/read/write memory card/customisation permissions, etc.) in order to perform malicious operations, such as receiving commands, persistence, and stealing confidential information.

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The main functionality relies on service and activity, the entry points are com.support.skmdoumi.loop and com.support.skmdoumi.MainActivity respectively.

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The MainActivity is mainly used to check and get the specified permissions, if not, then apply for the permissions.

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Then start the service with the name loop.

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The main role of the service is to prompt for an upgrade, decrypt a black image and place it in the topmost activity, and then thread the execution of the final malicious code.

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Loop through the corresponding malicious code according to the flag (default True).

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Firstly, collect Device IMEI information, after getting success, assemble it as string ‘Kur-{Device IMEI}_{Device IMEI}’, if failure, assemble it as Kur--{Device IMEI}_error_imei, due to its own Device IMEI can't be obtained so it is NULL, use json format to submit to l1.b function and then perform the return.

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Collects information about the device and sends it to the C&C server as ati parameters.

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The relevant C&C servers are shown below:

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The following functions are performed after connectivity, which are Sms_interval (SMS acquisition), Interval (time interval), Filelist (file list), Filedown (file download).

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Malware Analysis of Kimsuky's Attacks - elf

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Kimsuky used fewer elf samples, no new samples have been found, and only appeared in 2022, which was reproduced and analysed based on ④ information. This sample was compiled using go, and the main function is relatively simple. Firstly, it uses Crontab to persist, and then it connects back to C&C to execute the function.

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Communication control, whether downloading commands or uploading results, is via C2: http://216.189.159.34/mir/index.php.

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The related return command strings and execution functions as well as the corresponding instructions are as follows:

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Reference Links

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/OaECtSaeClPzFHslN_WamA

https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/30980/

https://medium.com/s2wblog/unveil-the-evolution-of-kimsuky-targeting- android-devices-with-newly-discovered-mobile-malware-280dae5a650

https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/springtail-kimsuky-backdoor -espionage

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